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CASE COMMENT
TRADE SECRETS: EXPANDING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF § 337: TIANRUI GROUP CO. v. INT'L TRADE
COML'N, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Miles S. Clark*
I. FACTS
Respondent Amsted Industries, Inc. (Amsted) owned both the "ABC
process" and the "Griffin process" for making steel railway wheels.'
Although Amsted only sold wheels made via the Griffin process in the
United States, it had licensed the ABC process to several firms who
manufactured wheels in China and sold them abroad. 2 After failing to
reach a licensing agreement with Amsted, Petitioner, TianRui Group
Company, Ltd. (TianRui), obtained the ABC process without Amsted's
permission. 3 Barber TianRui Railway Supply LLC, a subsequent
TianRui partnership, then began manufacturing wheels in China using
the ABC process and importing them into the United States.4 At
Amsted's request, the International Trade Commission (ITC)
investigated the incident, determined that TianRui had violated § 337 of
the Tariff Act of 193 0,5 and issued a limited exclusion order preventing
TianRui from importing the ABC process wheels into the United
6
States. TianRui appealed the ITC's decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, reasserting the following claims it made
*

University of Florida Levin College of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015.
1. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2. See id. at 1324-25. For the purposes of this Comment, "abroad" should be interpreted
as outside of the United States.
3. Id at 1324. "TianRui hired nine employees away from one of Amsted's Chinese
licensees, Datong ABC Castings Company Limited [(Datong)]." Id. Some of these employees
had been trained in the ABC method at a Datong plant in the United States, and others at
Datong's foundry in China. Id. All nine of the Datong employees had a duty not to divulge the
ABC method, and eight of the employees had signed confidentiality agreements before leaving
Datong. Id.
4. TianRui and TianRui Group Foundry Company, Ltd. partnered with Standard Car
Truck Company, Inc. to form Barber TianRui Railway Supply LLC, which markets the wheels
and imports them into the United States. Id.
5. Id. at 1325. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(2012), but, for consistency, will be referred to in this Comment as § 337.
6. Id. at 1326. The administrative law judge at the ITC applied Illinois state trade secret
law "because Amsted, SCT, and Barber all have their principal place of business in Illinois." Id
at 1325.
313
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to the ITC: first, Congress did not intend for § 337 to apply to cases
where misappropriation occurs abroad; and second, because Amsted no
longer made or sold wheels made via the ABC process in the United
States, no injury to a "domestic industry" had occurred.' HELD, § 337
gives the ITC the authority to investigate and grant relief for injuries to
a domestic industry stemming from extraterritorial misappropriation of
its trade secrets, even when the injured industry is not using the
misappropriated secret to produce articles domestically.8
II. HISTORY
The presumption against extraterritoriality (PAE) serves as a guide
in interpreting legislation and is aimed at avoiding the complex legal
and political repercussions of attempting to enforce U.S. law abroad.9
Unless Congress intends for a law to apply extraterritorially, it will only
apply "within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 0 Such
intent, however, may be inferred based upon the context of the
legislation.''
There are three principle theories in determining how the PAE
effects congressional legislation prohibiting certain conduct: first,
unless explicitly stated in the statute, Congress intends the statute to be
applicable only to acts occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States; second, Congress intends the statute to apply only if the
effect of the proscribed act (i.e., the injury) occurs within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States; and finally, territorial jurisdiction over
the location of either the act or the effect is sufficient to establish
applicability of the statute.12 In labor law cases, such as Equal
7. Id. at 1325-26, 1335. The administrative law judge at the ITC concluded that the ITC
had the authority to adjudicate the case because "section 337 focuses not on where the
misappropriation occurs but rather on the nexus between the imported articles and the unfair
methods of competition." Id. at 1325. The administrative law judge further held that "it was not
essential that the domestic industry use the proprietary process, as long as the misappropriation
of that process caused injury to the complainant's domestic industry." Id at 1326.
8. Id. at 1324.
9. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991).
10. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
11. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) ("Congress has not thought it
necessary to make specific provision in the law that the [location of an offense] shall include the
high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.");
see, e.g., United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Immigration statutes,
by their very nature, pertain to activity at or near international borders. It is natural to expect that
Congress intends for laws that regulate conduct that occurs near international borders to apply to
some activity that takes place on the foreign side of those borders.").
12. See Env't Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
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Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co., the
Supreme Court has applied the first theory, holding that without express
congressional intent, a law will not apply to acts done outside U.S.
jurisdiction.' 3 However, with respect to the enforcement of intellectual
property rights in international commercial disputes, determining the
PAE's applicability has had mixed results.14
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., a landmark case in
which United Fruit Co. cooperated with Costa Rican officials to
eliminate competition from rival American Banana Co., the Supreme
Court held that even legislative language "having universal scope, such
as '[e]very contract in restraint of trade,' '[e]very person who shall
monopolize,' [] will be taken as a matter of course to mean only every
However, in Steele v. Bulova
one subject to such legislation . . . .
Watch Co., the Supreme Court focused on the location of the effects
regarding the extraterritorial applicability of the Lanham Act of 1946.16
The Court stated that the holding in American Banana did not grant
"blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful
consequences here, merely because they were initiated or consummated
outside the territorial limits of the United States."' 7
In 1921, after the American Banana decision but prior to Bulova, the
Tariff Commission' 8 successfully petitioned Congress to include a
provision addressing concerns over foreign threats to domestic industry

(describing three general categories of cases for which the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes clearly does not apply).
13. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248, 259. This case hinged on the applicability of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited employment discrimination based
upon race, color, religion or national origin. Id at 248-49. Although an American company
perpetrated the discriminatory act, because it had occurred overseas, the Court determined that
Title VII did not apply in this case. Id. at 246-47. In making this determination, the Court ruled
that if Congress had intended Title VII to apply to discrimination that occurred extraterritorially,
it would make a "clear statement" of such intent. Id. at 258. Following this case, Congress
amended the legislation to include protection for overseas employees who were citizens of the
United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012).
14. Compare Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding
that "not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not within the Sherman
Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place and therefore were not torts at all"), and In
re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 835 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (holding that the Tariff
Commission did not have authority to exclude articles made by a patented process because
federal statutes limited the territorial scope of patent protection), with Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952) (holding that the Lanham Act of 1946 was applicable, thus
enjoining Steele from selling watches with the "Bulova" mark in Mexico).
15. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
16. See Bulova, 344 U.S. at 283-86.
17. Id. at 288.
18. The Tariff Commission was a precursor to the International Trade Commission.
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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in the Tariff Act of 1930.19 This provision, now codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1337, proscribes "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles ... into the United States, . . . the threat or effect
of which is . . . to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the

United States." 20 Section 337 also delegates authority to the ITC to
investigate alleged violations of the section and decide upon a means of
enforcement.21 One of the allowed means of enforcement is an order of
exclusion to prevent the articles' importation into the United States. 22
III. INSTANT CASE

The instant case establishes that § 337 cases should be decided based
upon a single federal standard of substantive law because such cases
pertain both to federal intellectual property law and to the federal matter
of foreign trade. 23 The instant case also affirmed the ITC's
interpretation that extraterritorial misappropriation of trade secrets is
included in the "unfair acts" proscribed by § 337.24 The TianRui court
held that the PAE did not apply in the instant case for the following
reasons: first, § 337 is directed expressly at "importation of articles,"
which is an "inherently international transaction," so Congress would
have been aware that the legislation would be applied to transgressions
committed outside the country;25 second, the extraterritorial misconduct
caused domestic injuries; 26 and third, legislative history regarding § 337
tends toward "broader and more flexible" language, which supports the
conclusion that Conpgress intended for Commission to consider conduct
that occurs abroad.2
Furthermore, the TianRui court distinguished precedent that has
denied the ITC's authority over cases involving extraterritorial patent
infringement by emphasizing that, in such cases, express limitations in
U.S. patent law prevented the application of § 337.28 In contrast, the
19. Id.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
21. Id. § 1337(b)-(i).
22. Id. § 1337(d)(1).
23. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1327.
24. Id. at 1326-27, 1335.
25. Id. at 1329.
26. Id
27. For example, "unfair competition" changed to "unfair methods of competition." Id at
1330-31.
28. Id. at 1333-34; cf In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 831 (C.C.P.A. 1935)
(holding that § 337 did not expand the substantive scope of federal patent law and, because at
that time U.S. patent protection was expressly limited to U.S. territories, the Commission did
not have authority to exclude products made by a patented process).
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court asserted, trade secrets have no statutory basis by which to deny §
337's applicability. 29
IV. ANALYSIS
The TianRui decision changed § 337 jurisprudence in two ways.
First, the Federal Circuit resolved ambiguity regarding the application
of federal versus state substantive law concerning § 337 disputes in
favor of a single federal standard.30 Second, and of greater significance,
the decision cemented the inclusion of extraterritorial trade secret
misappropriation into the "unfair acts in the importation of articles"
proscribed by subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of section 337.31 This second
aspect of the holding has two important implications that expand the
ITC's power. First, the court's construction broadens what constitutes
injury to a "domestic industry" according to subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of
section 337. 32 Second, the construction expands the phrase "in the
importation of articles" to encompass acts that are arguably quite
separate from the act of importation. 33 These two implications will be
discussed in Parts IV.A and IV.B.
A. No Express Requirementfor a RelatedIndustry
Because the misappropriated ABC process was no longer in
domestic use, the Federal Circuit may have improperly expanded the
domestic injury requirement in order to provide relief for Amsted.34
Although no company manufactured or sold wheels made via the ABC
process in the United States at the time in question, and Amsted had
previously elected to discontinue its ABC foundries in the United
States,35 the court still found injury to a domestic industry because the
imported ABC wheels would compete with Amsted's other railway
wheels. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit reasoned that
trade secret misappropriation analysis differs from that of statutory
29. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1333.
30. See id. at 1327. The Federal Circuit also points out the similarities between state and
federal trade secret law, emphasizing that specifics of substantive law would not have changed
the outcome of this case. Id at 1327-28.
31. Id. at 1331-32.
32. See generally, Viki Economides, TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n: The
Dubious Status of Extraterritorialityand the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61
AM. U. L. REV. 1235 (2012).
33. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1340-41 (Moore, J., dissenting).
34. See Economides, supra note 32, at 1247.
35. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324-25.
36. Id. at 1337.

3 18

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW & POLICY

[Vol. I 8

intellectual property because "there is no express requirement in the
general provision that the domestic industry relate to the intellectual
property involved in the investigation."37 However, the court essentially
applied the ITC's "'realities of the marketplace' test" to establish that
the competition of TianRui's imported wheels with Amsted's domestic
wheels was "sufficiently related to the investigation to constitute an
injury to an 'industry' within the meaning of section 337(a)(1)(A). 38
The TianRui court did not address whether, even in the absence of
Amsted's domestic production and sale of other railway wheels, the
domestic industry requirement could have been met by Amsted's
licensing agreements. Thus it remains unclear whether Amsted's
financial interest in licensing the ABC process to a foreign company
who sold the wheels abroad would qualify as a domestic industry to
satisfy § 337.40 If so, TianRui's possession of the ABC process would
certainly threaten to substantially injure or destroy that industry, and
perhaps bring the case more squarely under the ITC's jurisdiction. By
avoiding this issue, the Federal Circuit increased the ambiguity already
associated with interpreting § 337.41
B. In the ImportationofArticles
Embracing what it saw as a legislative trend toward broadening the
protections given by § 337,42 the majority did not interpret "in the
importation of articles" as a limitation on the ITC's jurisdiction over
unfair acts occurring abroad.4 3 The court decided that as long as the
37. Id. at 1335. Paragraph (a)(2) requires showing of injury to an industry "relating to the
articles protected . . . " and paragraph (3) defines an existing industry to include "substantial
investment in its . . . licensing." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012).
38. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1336-37.
39. See Economides, supra note 32, at 1250.
40. Id. Regarding statutory intellectual property, § 337 requires that that "an industry in
the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask
work, or design concerned, exists or is in the process of being established." 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(2). This section further provides that for an industry to exist in the United States there
must be "significant investment in plant and equipment; significant employment of labor or
capital; or substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and
development, or licensing." Id. § 1337(a)(3)(A)-(C).
41. See, e.g., In re Certain Floppy Disk Drives and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-203, USITC Pub. 1756, at 44-45 (Sept. 1985) (Commission Determination), 0085 WL
1127250 ("The Commission does not adhere to any rigid formula in determining the scope of
the domestic industry as it is not precisely defined in the statute, but will examine each case in
light of the realities of the marketplace."). It would be interesting to explore the implications of
the ITC's assertion, in the same paragraph, that "[t]he Commission customarily defines the
domestic industry as the domestic operationsof the intellectual property owner and its licensees
devoted to the exploitation of the intellectual property." Id. (emphasis added).
42. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1331-32.
43. Id. at 1334-35 ("[T]he statutory prohibition on 'unfair methods of competition and
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articles related to the unfair acts are eventually imported, no matter
where the acts occurred, the ITC has authority to exclude them. 44Te
majority asserted that "the determination of misappropriation was
merely a predicate to the charge that TianRui committed unfair acts in
importing its wheels into the United States."4 5 Therefore it seems that
the "unfair act" really comprises two acts: first, the actual
misappropriation of the trade secret; and second, the importation for
sale of the articles produced via that secret in competition with the trade
secret owner's products. 46 By thus linking the misappropriation of the
ABC process to the importation of the ABC wheels, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the unfair act had effectively occurred in the importation
of the wheels and therefore the ITC would not be regulating "purely
foreign conduct." 47
In stark contrast to the majority's broad interpretation of § 337's
scope, the dissent asserted that because the procedure of importing the
articles was not illegal, and "there [was] nothing illegal about having
TianRui's wheels in the United States," the unfair acts occurred entirely
in China.48 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the PAE should apply to
restrict the ITC's authority to regulate such matters.49 While the dissent
favored a more literal construction of § 337, the majority contended that
such an interpretation would render the ITC "powerless" to protect
domestic trade secret owners who suffer from having to compete with
goods made via their own stolen secrets "as long as the
misappropriating party was careful to ensure that the actual act of
conveying the trade secret occurred outside the United States."o The
majority further reasoned that it was "highly unlikely that Congress ...
would have intended to create such a conspicuous loophole for

unfair acts in the importation of articles . . . into the United States' naturally contemplates that
the unfair methods of competition and unfair acts leading to the prohibited importation will
include conduct that takes place abroad.").
44. Id. at 1331-32.
45. Id. at 1330.
46. Id. at 1329.
[T]he foreign "unfair" activity at issue in this case is relevant only to the extent
that it results in the importation of goods into this country causing domestic
injury. In light of the statute's focus on the act of importation and the resulting
domestic injury, the Commission's order does not purport to regulate purely
foreign conduct.
Id.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 1339 n.2 (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1330.
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misappropriators." 5 '
In spite of the majority's reasoning, the concerns that gave rise to the
PAE are still present.52 Although the ultimate enforcement mechanism
(i.e., the exclusion order) is a domestic procedure, at some point
investigation into misconduct that occurs entirely abroad will
necessarily occur outside the United States. As Judge Moore stated in
her dissent, the majority's holding signals that "importation opens the
door to scrutiny of all business practices of the importer .

.

. including

China."53

Although this particular case
those conducted entirely within
had clear evidence of misappropriation 54 and the court found no
significant conflict with Chinese authority,5 5 it remains to be seen
whether such conflict may always be avoided and, should conflict arise,
how it will be resolved. Furthermore, although the majority observed
that in this case, Chinese and U.S. substantive law essentially agreed,
and that China has assented to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, 56 the opinion makes no mention of how
§ 337 would apply if the foreign and U.S. substantive law differed.
V. CONCLUSION

With the vast amount of American intellectual property spread
around the world, particularly in China, it is difficult to embrace the
dissent's position. Such a stance would incentivize foreign-based
economic espionage by preventing the use, in such cases, of a critical
domestic enforcement mechanism (i.e., the ITC's ability to exclude
articles from entry into the United States). The majority's position, on
the other hand, offers domestic companies who have had their trade
secrets stolen abroad a means to protect themselves from the unfair
competition resulting from the theft. In this instance, the majority
holding seems to be fair in light of TianRui's culpable actions in
obtaining Amsted's ABC process and then marketing and selling the
wheels made using that process domestically. What remains
questionable is whether Congress actually intended § 337 to apply to the
extraterritorial misappropriation of a trade secret when the owner of the
secret does not produce or sell a product of that secret domestically.
5 1. Id.
52. See, e.g., Economides, supra note 32, at 1243-44.
53. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1338 (Moore, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1325 ("[S]ome of the TianRui specifications contained the same typographical
errors that were found in the Datong documents.").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1332-33.
57. Id. at 1330.

